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Field Notes
With the growing use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) within humanitarian mine action (HMA), the need for standardized training is becoming in-
creasingly important to mitigate factors that may otherwise 
inhibit their wider use. The first formal training course for 
people in HMA to qualify as small unmanned aircraft (SUA) 
pilots served as an opportunity to pursue this goal and was 
held at the MAT Kosovo training centre in September 2017.1 
The instructors were from a U.K. company training to U.K. 
Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) standards for commercial 
SUA pilots.2,3 Although drone and UAV are popular terms 
to describe all umanned aircraft, the term SUA is used by 
some civil aviation authorities to describe specifically light- 
weight models.4,5 
Those in attendance included trainees from across the HMA 
sector: field workers from Libya and Syria, dog handlers, serv-
ing soldiers, and researchers. One trainee was a qualified explo-
sive ordnance disposal (EOD) technician and also a software 
developer who attended in order to benefit interdisciplinary re-
search. Some students had extensive flying experience, while 
others had none, but all learned a great deal from the profes-
sional instructors over five intense days that included many 
testing flights. 
The course was offered because national and supranation-
al civil aviation authorities around the world are increasingly 
controlling the use of unmanned aircraft of all sizes and re-
quire pilots to have demonstrated proficiency.6 The main driv-
ers behind this are air safety, privacy, and security concerns; 
these same concerns also apply in HMA. During the train-
ing, many who attended helped contribute to the first, gener-
ic SUA standard operating procedures (SOP) for HMA, which 
the author was there to draft.7 The SOP is intended to ensure 
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that safety, privacy, and security concerns are addressed in ways 
that give national mine action authorities the confidence to au-
thorize the controlled use of SUA in HMA. 
Safety, Privacy, and Security
The uncontrolled use of any unmanned aircraft raises safe-
ty, privacy, and security concerns in every country. Civilians 
wanting to use unmanned aircraft commercially in the United 
Kingdom must be registered with the CAA and demonstrate 
an appropriate level of training for the category of aircraft that 
they will fly. Remote pilot certification is granted for a category 
of aircraft and a maximum take-off weight.   
Safety. Wherever HMA operators work, concerns about air-
craft safety—terrestrial and in the air—can be addressed via 
the imposition of best practice pilot training requirements and 
aircraft deployment rules that are imposed by the relevant civ-
il aviation authorities. However, when the relevant national 
Image 1. Taken from a quadcopter, this photograph shows the people at-
tending the training course in Kosovo. 
Image courtesy of Training Solutions - Unmanned Aviation Services.
Images 2–4. Training took place in the classroom, on simulators, and in the air with a range of SUA.  
Images courtesy of the author.
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authority is inoperative or has yet to publish requirements, the 
adoption of those published by internationally respected civ-
il aviation authorities can be the next best option for anyone 
concerned with showing that they have done everything pos-
sible to manage risk. 
Privacy. While privacy concerns may be covered in rele-
vant civil aviation authority flight restrictions, HMA opera-
tors should also respect the concerns of the people in the flight 
path, particularly when flying with a downward facing cam-
era. Ignoring local concerns about personal privacy can be a 
risk to both the aircraft and its pilot, so good community liai-
son and response is usually required in HMA.
Security. Broader than the invasion of privacy involved in 
camera overflights, security concerns involve even the small-
est category of unmanned aircraft, the SUA, which can be 
readily adapted for weapon delivery. In Syria, for example, the 
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has manufactured many 
SUA for uses ranging from combat reconnaissance to flying an 
explosive payload directly into a target. Notably, ISIS has pur-
chased commercially available SUA, overcome their software 
restrictions, and adapted them to carry and release bombs. 
Security concerns are legitimate and the weaponizing of SUA 
is a concern that must be recognized, respected, and answered 
by those using SUA as tools in HMA, especially in regions 
where combat may be ongoing.
Image 5. Part of an ISIS, fixed-wing-SUA factory after its capture in 
2017.
Image courtesy of Conflict Armament Research at http://www.confictarm.com.
Images 6–8. This commercially available SUA has been adapted to carry and re-
lease the small multi-purpose bombs shown. The bombs were manufactured in an 
ISIS factory.
Images courtesy of Conflict Armament Research at http://www.confictarm.com.8
HMA Experience with SUA
Despite the fact that the concept of eye in the sky has yet to 
be fully explored, it is no surprise that the pilot training course 
hosted by MAT Kosovo was well attended because the utili-
ty of SUA in HMA has already been proven. From the early 
iterations of the large Schiebel Camcopter to today’s battery 
powered SUA, there have always been obvious advantages in 
gaining a low-altitude overview of the working area.9 Aerial 
imagery is widely used in HMA. Image 9 is a screenshot show-
ing destroyed ammunition storage bunkers at the Waddan 
weapons storage site in Libya made in 2012. Even high-level 
images like this were a great help when trying to assess the ex-
tent of the problem faced at that time.10 The resolution in Image 
8 is low, does not show the target from all angles, and is not as 
up-to-date as an image recorded minutes ago. 
Some international nongovernmental organizations (INGO) 
have used commercially available SUA when identifying high-
risk areas and planning deployments for years. Norwegian 
People’s Aid (NPA), for example, reported on the use of a 
commercial quadcopter camera system in Iraq during 2014. 
The SUA was used for basic task planning and to closely 
inspect possible hazards during pre-deployment survey. Since 
the pictures in image 9 were taken, automatic mapping systems 
and support software have improved dramatically, and the list 
of potential uses has grown. 
SUA Utility for HMA
During the pilot training at MAT Kosovo, participants 
compiled the following list of ten generic uses for SUA with-
in HMA:
1 . Close visual inspection.
2. Inspecting vehicles. 
3. Mapping.
4. Non-technical survey.
5. Placing disruption/demolition systems.
6. Placing lightweight hook and line equipment.
7. Pre-deployment survey. (continued on page 48)
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8. Progress mapping, quality assurance, and quality 
control.
9. Training and testing.
1 0. Visual survey in building interiors.
Achieving everything on this list would require developing 
SUA technology so that it is able to perform the same tasks 
as small EOD robots. Also, SUA would need to be capable of 
making detailed, interior-camera surveys without retaining 
line of sight (autonomously or by control signal enhancement). 
However, while many of the uses would benefit from technical 
developments and/or software add-ons, it is apparent that all 
have immediate potential. 
Apart from conventional and infrared cameras, no com-
plete, functional mine-detection systems for small SUA have 
been proven in the field. The ability to detect near-surface or 
hard-to-discriminate targets by enhanced analysis of visual 
imagery and/or the use of hyperspectral and thermal sensors 
may prove valuable, but their use parameters have not yet been 
defined. Moreover, it is unclear whether the existing technol-
ogy can be made reliable enough for humanitarian use.
Other unexplored examples worth pursing include using a 
SUA camera to monitor explosive detection dogs during com-
plex searches or in regular oversight during manual or me-
chanical deployments. Whenever an operative is obliged to 
work entirely alone, an SUA could provide extra information 
and allow the operative to receive informed, remote advice or 
oversight. During demolitions in which the author was recent-
ly involved, using a SUA to inspect the outcome proved use-
ful, often saving time with no reduction in safety. It is probable 
that the controlled use of SUA during demolitions will quickly 
become routine.
A Cautionary Endnote
There has not been a new technology so useful to HMA since 
the development of ground compensating metal detectors. 
Image 9. Screenshot of destroyed ammunition storage bunkers at the 
Waddan weapons storage site, Libya.
Image courtesy of GoogleEarth.
Image 10. Quadcopter photo of Iraq in 2014.
Image courtesy of Ed Rowe, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), Iraq 2014.11
Better still, as well as increasing efficiency, the effective use of 
SUA should have immediate safety advantages by increasing 
the information available to the operative. However, as with all 
new tools and procedures, the industry must not ask too much 
of the technology. Safety in HMA is primarily about the safety 
of the people who will use the land. An absence of visible haz-
ards cannot prove that there are no hazards present, so the 
temptation to release land based on evidence from a camera 
overflight alone must be avoided. 
See endnotes page 67
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Image 11. Screenshot from a video captured by an SUA overflying de-
molitions.
Image courtesy of John Fardoulis.12
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